

Supplementary Appendix for: Gender and Political Compliance under Authoritarian Rule

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Abstract

When autocrats do not impose explicit rules of behavior on their subjects, what does political compliance look like? Existing research suggests that such conditions generate uncertainty, leading risk-averse individuals to self-censor in an effort to minimize the risk of punishment. In this paper, we find that women and men differ in how they express political compliance under conditions of uncertainty. Focusing on Confucius Institute teachers who are given broad objectives but no specific rules of political behavior, we use interviews, a global survey, and an experiment to show that women express compliance by increasing uncensored discussions to persuade host country students toward the Chinese regime's point of view. In contrast, men comply by vociferously defending the party line and censoring further discussions. These gendered strategies of political compliance are rooted in the differing gender socialization experiences of men and women, who face divergent expectations on how they should interact with others.

Keywords: gender, political compliance, Confucius Institutes, China, interviews, survey experiment

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A Online Supplementary Appendix

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A.1 Appendix: Ethical considerations

Our study engages two groups of participants: 1) interviewees and 2) survey respondents. Interviewees include teachers, directors, and administrators at Confucius Institutes (CI); Survey respondents are teachers at CI.

We obtained consent from both groups of participants. We informed all interviewees at the beginning of the interview about the purpose of this study, time involvement (typically one hour per interview), that the interview was not paid, anonymity and confidentiality of their responses, and the names, affiliations, and contact information of all authors of this research. For survey respondents, we provide all the information stated above, plus information about respondents' compensation and contact details of our university IRB, in a consent form at the beginning of the survey. Each survey respondent was paid 20 CNY upon completion of the survey. This is a standard rate for social surveys of the same length as ours (15-20 minutes) in China. No deception was used. All interviewees and survey respondents were informed that they could opt-out at any time.

Our participant pool does not include groups considered vulnerable or marginalized (e.g., minors). All interviewees and survey respondents were Chinese nationals over the age of 18. As shown in Section A.3, participants had diverse socio-demographic backgrounds; 58 percent of them identify as women, and participants varied in age, CCP membership, education levels, and teaching experience. In addition, this study does not differentially benefit or harm any particular group. All interviewees and survey respondents are treated in equal manner.

Since participants of our study work for organizations run by the Chinese government (Confucius Institutes) and we ask questions related to political behavior during interviews and survey, there are two main risks to participants. First, there is the possibility of retaliation from the Chinese government upon breach of confidentiality. This risk is low because the questions we ask are not directly linked to evaluations of teachers, but it is nonetheless a risk we took seriously. Second, because Confucius Institutes are subjects of contention and controversy in countries like the United States and Australia, participants working in these countries might worry that any exposure of their identity would lead to

negative consequences for their relations with host-country students, colleagues, and their host-country schools.

We took four steps to minimize these risks and protect the confidentiality of our interviewees and survey respondents. First, we did not record any personally identifiable information about any interviewees or survey respondents. For the interviews, no recording was used. For the survey, we did not ask any questions that are out of norm for what a CI teacher would encounter in schools (e.g. information about their family), where the teacher's identity would be known. Our payment method for survey respondents utilized a mobile payment gift system that did not require collecting any personally identifiable information. Second, to protect the privacy of participants, each interviewee and survey respondent could participate in the place and time of their choosing. The survey took place online; the interviews were all conducted in a private, one-on-one setting. Third, in the paper, we avoid providing specific details about participants' geographic location. Specifically, for participants working in countries that only have a few (<5) Confucius Institutes, we do not report the country name but just report the region (e.g. Africa); for participants working in countries that have more Confucius Institutes, we do not disclose their location below the country level (e.g. in the US, we do not report the state location of participants). Finally, before conducting this research, we consulted extensively with Confucius Institute directors and teachers in the United States and in other countries to ensure that our interviews and survey are appropriate, safe, and abide by the laws and regulations in the local contexts where we plan to recruit participants.

A.2 Appendix: Additional information from interviews

CI Teacher Selection: Hanban has a pool of CI teachers that individual Confucius Institutes can choose from. Chinese nationals who are current teachers or university students can apply to join this pool. After going through the initial CI teacher application online, we find no questions related to management of political topics or responses to these topics. Most questions are related to the applicant’s experience teaching Chinese and their Mandarin and foreign language capabilities.

After the online application, some candidates are selected to participate in a written test followed by a face-to-face interview. None of the 25 CI teachers we interviewed recall any questions pertaining to their political orientation in either the written test or the in-person interview. Instead, they recall questions related to their teaching credentials, foreign language skills, and psychological traits such as positivity and emotional stability. Face-to-face interviews consist of 10 minutes of conversation in English or in the language of the host country and 20 minutes of general questions related to teaching, such as simulating a class on teaching Chinese grammar. Rather than a political assignment, interviewees describe the CI experience as a type of “gap year” from their work in China.

Textbook Selection Teaching materials and textbooks used by CI teachers are not mandated by the Chinese government. Hanban introduces its textbooks to CI teachers during the training in China, but it does not require teachers to use Hanban-provided textbooks.¹

Among our survey respondents, roughly half (52 percent) used textbooks provided by Hanban. The remainder used books provided by host-country schools (21 percent), prepared by themselves and other CI teachers (16 percent),² or other sources (see p. 48). Example textbooks used by teachers that do not come from Hanban include *Better Immersion* (中文游) published by the US-based Better Chinese, LLC and *Chinese Wonderland* (华语小学堂) jointly published by the Taiwan-based Knowledge Bank Co., Ltd. and the San Jose-based Mandarin Language and Cultural Center.³


¹Previous research also shows that while Hanban-provided textbooks tend to describe little social tension in China, CI teachers are not required to use these textbooks. See Fallon (2015); Hubbert (2019).

²“孔院教师自编教材”.


³For rationale on the selection of textbooks, see p. 48.

A.3 Appendix: Descriptive statistics of survey participants


Gender




Prior Teaching Experience




CCP Membership




Education




CI Experience




Region of host country




Length of Hanban Training




Motivation for Joining CI




Perceived mission of CI teachers




The main textbook you use at school is:




Why do you choose this textbook?




Main teaching focus at CI




Student Composition




For each of your student group at local school, do you lead all classes independently?




For each of your student group at local school, does your course count into their GPA/grades?



Does the class you teach have students of Chinese descent?




Frequency of interaction with local teachers




Perceptions on host country


0=Strongly Disagree; 10=Strongly Agree




Consumption of Chinese media while abroad




Consumption of host-country media while abroad



Consumption of news through Chinese media while abroad



Consumption of news through host-country media while abroad



How friendly do you feel the media in your host country is towards China?
 (0 = very unfriendly, 10 = very friendly)




Table A1: Comparing US respondents vs. non-US respondents on Descriptives

	US respondents	Non-US respondents	p-value
Join CI for career improvement	0.62	0.658	0.619
Believe CI has a political mission	0.46	0.399	0.439
Use textbooks requested by Hanban	0.104	0.175	0.172

Notes: Entries are proportion of CI teachers.

A.4 Appendix: Outcome measures in the survey experiment

In each treatment and control condition, after respondents read a vignette, they were asked to assume the role of the hypothetical CI teacher in the vignette and choose one of the following (words in *Italic* and in brackets were not shown to respondents):

1. *Hard self-censorship*: Tell students this question is irrelevant to class and continue with class [In-class student vignette]; tell the student / teacher you are not equipped to explain this issue and change the topic of conversation [Private student/colleague conversation vignettes].
2. *Soft self-censorship*: Tell students this question is irrelevant to class [In-class student vignette]; tell the student / teacher you are not equipped to explain this issue [Private student/colleague conversation vignettes], and suggest they do their own research.

3. *Directed soft self-censorship*: Tell students this question is irrelevant to class [In-class student vignette]; Tell the student / teacher you are not equipped to explain this issue [Private student/colleague conversation vignettes], and suggest that they do their own research and provide some reference resources from the CCP.
4. *Soft self-censorship with private discussion*: Tell students this question is irrelevant to class and should be discussed after class. Then discuss the Taiwan issue with the student privately after class if he/she asks again [In-class student vignette only].
5. *One-sided position-taking*: State that Taiwan is part of PRC, but do not let the student/teacher respond or further express their views [all vignettes].
6. *Two-sided position-introduction*: Introduce the PRC's position and Taiwan's position on the issue, but do not let the student/teacher respond or further express their views [all vignettes].
7. *Open discussion*: Openly exchange views on the Taiwan issue with the student/teacher [all vignettes].
8. *Other*: (open-ended)

We designed these options to include a wide variety of behavioral responses, ranging from self-censorship to an open communication, that are realistic to CI teachers. All the responses are those the CI teachers we interviewed said they had used to answer political questions from their students and colleagues. We divided these options into three groups: 1) self-censorship (Options 1-4); 2) position-taking (Options 5-6); and 3) open discussion (Option 7). We randomized the order of the three groups and the order of options within each group.

The outcome we call “self-censor” is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent chooses not to state *any* position on the Taiwan issue in the vignette (Options 1-4), and 0 otherwise. The outcome we call “one-sided” is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent chooses to only state the PRC's position on the Taiwan issue and not let host-country students or colleagues express their views (Option 5), and

0 otherwise. The outcome “two-sided” is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent chooses to introduce the PRC’s and Taiwan’s positions but not allow students or colleagues to express their views (Option 6), and 0 otherwise. Finally, the outcome “open discussion” is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent chooses to openly exchange views on the Taiwan issue with host-country students or colleagues (Option 7), and 0 otherwise.

A.5 Appendix: Details of overall treatment effects

A.5.1 Covariate balance

Table A2: Covariate Balance across Treatment Conditions

	# Respondents	Control	Objectives	Social	p-value
Seniority in CI	284	0.457	0.375	0.363	0.357
Age	284	32.8	35.2	33.3	0.224
Female	284	0.543	0.546	0.656	0.204
CCP member	284	0.500	0.422	0.531	0.356
Graduate degree	284	0.617	0.577	0.630	0.740
Years at CI	284	1.608	1.706	1.815	0.596
Teaching exp before CI (Y/N)	284	0.489	0.485	0.457	0.891
Hanban training over 1 month	284	0.383	0.458	0.452	0.515
Perceived friendliness of host-country media on China	284	7.521	7.695	7.430	0.602

Notes: P-values corresponding to F tests of the Objectives Prime and Social Prime indicators.

A.5.2 Preference falsification and experimenter effect

Table A3 shows that there is no significant difference in self-censorship, one-sided position-taking, two-sided position introduction, or open discussion on the Taiwan issue between respondents who are reminded of the confidentiality of their answers before they read the treatment primes and those who are not. Table A4 shows that there is no significant difference in any of these four outcome measures between respondents in the US and those outside of the US in the control group. Table A5 shows no significant difference in attri-

tion rate across treatments after respondents read the primes and the first Taiwan vignette. These suggest that preference falsification is not at work.

Table A3: Difference in Responses between Reminder of Confidentiality and No Reminder

	Reminder	No reminder	p-value
Overall			
Self-censor	0.230	0.296	0.125
One-sided	0.447	0.379	0.156
Two-sided	0.186	0.177	0.820
Open discussion	0.137	0.148	0.754
Observations	226	203	–
Women			
Self-censor	0.205	0.265	0.265
One-sided	0.477	0.419	0.356
Two-sided	0.189	0.188	0.978
Open discussion	0.129	0.128	0.989
Observations	132	117	–

Notes: Entries are proportions. P-value is from two-sample t-tests.

Table A4: Difference in Responses between US and non-US respondents in Control

	US respondents	Non-US respondents	p-value
Self-censor	0.391	0.339	0.649
One-sided	0.261	0.393	0.215
Two-sided	0.261	0.125	0.180
Open discussion	0.087	0.143	0.421
Observations	23	112	–

Notes: Entries are proportions. P-value is from two-sample t-tests.

Table A6 shows that the Objectives Prime and Social Prime have no statistically significant effects on the responses of CI teachers to the placebo topic (high school dating) across outcome measures, including self-censorship, one-sided position-taking, two-sided position introduction, and open discussion.⁴ Results are based on logistic regression, but

⁴All columns control for pre-treatment covariates including respondent's age, gender (not controlled in

Table A5: Difference in Attrition Rates across Treatments

	Control	Objectives	Social	Objectives vs. Control	Objectives vs. Social
Drop-out rate after prime only	–	0.01	0.06	–	0.055
Drop-out rate after prime and the first Taiwan vignette	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.97	0.30

Notes: Entries are proportions. The last two columns are p-values from t-tests. The drop-out rate after prime only cannot be measured in the control condition because no reflection question was asked after respondents read the control prime.

Table A6: Effects of Objectives Prime and Social Prime on Placebo Topic

	Self-censor	One-sided	Two-sided	Open discussion
Overall				
Objectives Prime	0.177 (0.336)	–0.017 (0.296)	0.469 (0.290)	–0.531 (0.411)
Social Prime	–0.454 (0.365)	0.118 (0.298)	0.116 (0.293)	0.088 (0.365)
Baseline rate	0.218	0.239	0.366	0.176
Observations	403	403	403	403
Men				
Objectives Prime	–0.259 (0.506)	0.217 (0.478)	0.651 (0.502)	–0.205 (0.762)
Social Prime	–0.445 (0.568)	–0.403 (0.522)	0.118 (0.589)	1.169 (0.718)
Baseline rate	0.283	0.35	0.267	0.1
Observations	167	167	167	167
Women				
Objectives Prime	0.688 (0.479)	–0.049 (0.363)	0.535 (0.360)	–0.689 (0.518)
Social Prime	–0.490 (0.530)	0.485 (0.361)	0.216 (0.341)	–0.283 (0.458)
Baseline rate	0.171	0.159	0.439	0.232
Observations	236	236	236	236

Notes: All regressions use logit model. Unit is respondent-vignette. Estimates are logit coefficients. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

remain substantively unchanged if other parametric model is used. This suggests that experimenter demand effect is not at work.

A.5.3 Overall treatment effects (regression estimates)

Tables A7 and A8 present the regression estimates using OLS and logit models.⁵ On average, reminding CI teachers of the objectives of the CCP regime makes teachers less likely to self-censor and more likely to engage in one-sided position-taking.

Table A7: Overall Treatment Effects (first vignette of each respondent)

	Self-censor		One-sided		Two-sided		Open discussion	
	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit
Objectives Prime	-0.161** (0.067)	-0.146*** (0.055)	0.172** (0.084)	0.173** (0.084)	-0.023 (0.055)	-0.024 (0.065)	0.019 (0.058)	0.020 (0.059)
Social Prime	-0.163** (0.069)	-0.147*** (0.056)	-0.043 (0.089)	-0.042 (0.085)	0.116* (0.063)	0.110 (0.069)	0.056 (0.054)	0.060 (0.060)
Baseline rate	0.362	0.362	0.372	0.372	0.149	0.149	0.117	0.117
Observations	284	284	284	284	284	284	284	284

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Logit regression coefficients indicate marginal effects on the probability of the outcomes. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

the men and women panels), educational level, CCP membership, years of work experience, current status and seniority at CI, motivations for joining CI, consumption of PRC and host-country media, and their frequency of interactions with host-country colleagues.

⁵In Tables A7 and A8, all columns control for pre-treatment covariates including respondent's age, gender, educational level, CCP membership, years of work experience, current status and seniority at CI, motivations for joining CI, consumption of PRC and host-country media, and their frequency of interactions with host-country colleagues. Figure 3 in the main paper presents the OLS results of Table A7.

Table A8: Overall Treatment Effects (all vignettes)

	Self-censor		One-sided		Two-sided		Open discussion	
	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit
Objectives Prime	-0.125** (0.059)	-0.115** (0.050)	0.139** (0.068)	0.139** (0.067)	0.006 (0.050)	0.007 (0.058)	-0.003 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.048)
Social Prime	-0.121** (0.058)	-0.112** (0.051)	0.029 (0.069)	0.030 (0.066)	0.073 (0.054)	0.072 (0.058)	0.009 (0.049)	0.009 (0.047)
Baseline rate	0.348	0.348	0.370	0.370	0.148	0.148	0.133	0.133
Observations	429	429	429	429	429	429	429	429

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Logit regression coefficients indicate marginal effects on the probability of the outcomes. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

A.6 Appendix: Details of heterogeneous effects by gender

A.6.1 Effects by gender (regression estimates)

Table A9 presents the treatment effects among men and women CI teachers, respectively, using only the first vignette answered by each respondent. The table shows that in line with the results in Table A10 where all vignettes are included in analyses, the Objectives Prime motivates divergent political behaviors between men and women.

Table A9: Effects by Gender (first vignette of each respondent)

	Self-censor		One-sided		Two-sided		Open discussion	
	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit
Men								
Objectives Prime	0.007 (0.123)	-0.013 (0.112)	0.237** (0.105)	0.235** (0.105)	0.026 (0.104)	-0.001 (0.086)	-0.233** (0.103)	-0.214*** (0.076)
Social Prime	0.040 (0.115)	0.103 (0.127)	0.064 (0.125)	0.065 (0.118)	0.044 (0.106)	0.017 (0.095)	-0.045 (0.119)	-0.044 (0.075)
Baseline rate	0.326	0.326	0.302	0.302	0.163	0.163	0.209	0.209
Observations	119	119	119	119	119	119	119	119
Women								
Objectives Prime	-0.233*** (0.089)	-0.190*** (0.065)	-0.012 (0.112)	-0.013 (0.106)	-0.001 (0.091)	0.002 (0.102)	0.167** (0.072)	0.251** (0.110)
Social Prime	-0.231** (0.091)	-0.206*** (0.072)	-0.077 (0.114)	-0.073 (0.100)	0.111 (0.105)	0.112 (0.098)	0.127** (0.053)	0.177** (0.090)
Baseline rate	0.392	0.392	0.431	0.431	0.137	0.137	0.039	0.039
Observations	165	165	165	165	165	165	165	165

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Logit regression coefficients indicate marginal effects on the probability of the outcomes. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.


Table A10: Effects by Gender (all vignettes)

	Self-censor		One-sided		Two-sided		Open discussion	
	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	Logit
Men								
Objectives Prime	0.018 (0.104)	0.020 (0.097)	0.216** (0.108)	0.214** (0.097)	-0.034 (0.085)	-0.034 (0.078)	-0.200** (0.087)	-0.161** (0.068)
Social Prime	0.069 (0.100)	0.103 (0.109)	0.110 (0.114)	0.108 (0.110)	-0.038 (0.088)	-0.061 (0.079)	-0.141 (0.089)	-0.111* (0.060)
Baseline rate	0.299	0.299	0.299	0.299	0.179	0.179	0.224	0.224
Observations	180	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
Women								
Objectives Prime	-0.203*** (0.076)	-0.165*** (0.056)	0.055 (0.095)	0.054 (0.090)	0.086 (0.061)	0.113 (0.085)	0.126** (0.054)	0.180** (0.092)
Social Prime	-0.161** (0.077)	-0.139** (0.064)	-0.070 (0.095)	-0.070 (0.088)	0.124** (0.062)	0.145* (0.077)	0.123*** (0.047)	0.166** (0.080)
Baseline rate	0.397	0.397	0.441	0.441	0.118	0.118	0.044	0.044
Observations	249	249	249	249	249	249	249	249

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Logit regression coefficients indicate marginal effects on the probability of the outcomes. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Response by gender in control group Figure 1 presents the four outcome measures by


Figure 1: Response by Gender in Control Group



gender in the control condition. There is no statistically significant difference between men and women on self-censor, one-sided, and two-sided in the control group. But, men in the control condition are significantly more likely to openly discuss the Taiwan issue than women. In Figures 2(a) and 2(b) below, we break down the control group by age and find that this gender difference in open discussion is entirely driven by respondents below the age of 30 (the average age of respondents is 34). Figure 2(a) shows that in the control group, men are more likely to openly discuss the Taiwan issue than women among respondents aged 30 or below. Figure 2(b) shows that this gender difference disappears among respondents over 30 in the control group. That said, in both age groups (below 30 and over 30), the heterogeneous effects of the Objectives Prime by gender remain substantively unchanged. Figure 2(c) shows that in both age groups, the Objectives Prime increases open discussion among women and decreases open discussion among men.

The CCP regime's political objectives (the three disciplinary principles) were only introduced to CI teachers during a single lecture in their 30-day pre-assignment training. As a result, while teachers are familiar with these objectives when reminded, they are not likely to think about them constantly. This mirrors real-world conditions under authoritar-

Figure 2: Response by Gender and Age



ian rule—people, even in repressive contexts, do not always focus on political compliance but adjust their behavior when specific triggers arose. In the control condition, where respondents are not reminded of the CCP’s political authority, both men and women choose their behavior based on their socialization experience (“what do I feel comfortable with”) without the need to consider political compliance.

In social settings where the need for political compliance is not triggered, research in politics and social psychology show that men, who are socialized to be assertive and to enhance their social status through conversation, tend to be more talkative and active in discussions, including on political topics, compared to women (Beauvais, 2020; Dasonneville and Kostelka, 2021; Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014; Wood and Fixmer-Oraiz, 2018). Therefore, in the control condition, men are more likely than women to openly discuss Taiwan’s sovereignty.

The Objectives Prime reminds CI teachers of the CCP’s three disciplinary principles, guiding their behavior toward political compliance. In this treatment condition, teachers’ actions are driven by the need to comply with the regime, which while influenced by their socialization experience, differs from how they might behave without the pressure to comply. Men, socialized to be assertive and forceful, are likely to view censoring discussion and parroting the party line as the most effective way to comply. Conversely, while women may feel less comfortable discussing contentious political issues in a neutral social setting (control), the Objectives Prime prompts them to actively defend the CCP’s position. Since women are often encouraged to be agreeable, they may perceive the agreeable response—allowing for open discussion—as the best way to support the regime’s goals. This is why, under the Objectives Prime, women shift from self-censoring to encouraging open discussion, compared to the control condition.

A.6.2 Gendered effects by CCP membership

Table A11 shows that there is no statistically significant difference in the gendered effects between CCP members vs. non-CCP members. Among non-CCP members, the Objectives Prime makes men more likely to assert the CCP position and then censor discussion, suggesting that CI teachers who are non-CCP members still tow the CCP line.

Table A11: Difference in gendered effects between CCP vs. non-CCP members

	Self-censor	One-sided	Two-sided	Open discussion
Objectives * female * ccp	0.305 (0.285)	0.033 (0.281)	-0.138 (0.099)	-0.026 (0.187)
Social * female * ccp	0.122 (0.292)	-0.071 (0.271)	-0.066 (0.178)	0.131 (0.305)
Objectives * female	-0.223** (0.104)	-0.123 (0.176)	0.080 (0.206)	0.455** (0.195)
Objectives * ccp	0.154 (0.202)	-0.273** (0.131)	0.005 (0.171)	0.098 (0.182)
female * ccp	-0.308*** (0.090)	0.235 (0.192)	0.022 (0.177)	0.069 (0.195)
Social * female	-0.144 (0.156)	-0.153 (0.187)	0.201 (0.241)	0.206 (0.197)
Social * ccp	0.219 (0.232)	-0.226 (0.175)	0.013 (0.192)	-0.044 (0.115)
Objectives	-0.027 (0.143)	0.290** (0.141)	0.002 (0.144)	-0.178* (0.094)
Social	-0.080 (0.160)	0.214 (0.151)	-0.017 (0.152)	-0.070 (0.088)
Female	0.217** (0.096)	0.082 (0.159)	-0.050 (0.141)	-0.319** (0.128)
CCP	0.060 (0.132)	0.054 (0.159)	0.053 (0.127)	-0.082 (0.085)
Control rate in male and non-CCP group	0.21	0.29	0.14	0.36
Observations	429	429	429	429

Notes: All models use logit model. Coefficients indicate marginal effects on the probability of the outcome. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A12 shows that among non-CCP members and CCP members, respectively, the Objectives Prime has significantly heterogeneous effects by gender.

Table A12: Gender-based heterogeneous effects by CCP membership

	Open discussion (non-CCP)	Open discussion (CCP)
Objectives * female	0.437*** (0.163)	0.462** (0.224)
Social * female	0.209 (0.188)	0.392* (0.211)
Objectives	-0.188** (0.096)	-0.108 (0.076)
Social	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.118 (0.096)
Female	-0.346** (0.142)	-0.238* (0.132)
Control rate among men	0.36	0.22
Observations	187	180

Notes: All models use logit model. Coefficients indicate marginal effects on the probability of the outcome. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

A.6.3 Gendered effects by vignettes

Heterogeneous effects by vignettes within each gender Table A13 shows that among men CI teachers, the effect of Objectives Prime does not differ significantly across the three vignettes (in-class, private student, and private colleague). Also, note that in the baseline vignette (private student vignette), Objectives Prime decreases open discussion and increases one-sided position taking among men, which are consistent with the results when we use men's responses to the three vignettes together (see Table A9 above).

Table A13: Heterogeneous effects by vignettes among men

	Self-censor	One-sided	Two-sided	Open discussion
Objectives * in-class	-0.086 (0.268)	-0.085 (0.231)	-0.019 (0.173)	0.135 (0.175)
Objectives * private colleague	-0.038 (0.229)	-0.111 (0.219)	0.168 (0.171)	-0.051 (0.197)
Social * in-class	0.169 (0.263)	-0.098 (0.227)	-0.187 (0.250)	0.242 (0.198)
Social * private colleague	0.343* (0.200)	-0.000 (0.214)	-0.368** (0.167)	-0.034 (0.202)
Objectives Prime	0.057 (0.200)	0.272* (0.159)	-0.110 (0.083)	-0.247** (0.122)
Social Prime	-0.113 (0.155)	0.186 (0.155)	0.185 (0.143)	-0.212 (0.138)
In-class vignette	0.029 (0.173)	0.029 (0.141)	0.104 (0.148)	-0.144 (0.126)
Private colleague vignette	-0.176 (0.138)	0.000 (0.135)	0.118 (0.110)	0.118 (0.141)
Control rate in private student vignette	0.33	0.33	0.12	0.21
Observations	180	180	180	180

Notes: Private student conversation vignette is the base category vignette. All models use OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table A14 shows that among women CI teachers, the effect of Objectives Prime does not differ significantly across the three vignettes (in-class, private student, and private colleague). Also, note that in the baseline vignette (private student vignette), Objectives Prime increases open discussion and decreases self-censorship among women, which are consistent with those when we use women’s responses to the three vignettes together (see Table A9 above).⁶

Table A14: Heterogeneous effects by vignettes among women

	Self-censor	One-sided	Two-sided	Open discussion
Objectives * in-class	0.084 (0.195)	-0.129 (0.209)	0.008 (0.136)	-0.018 (0.130)
Objectives * private colleague	-0.061 (0.193)	0.032 (0.222)	0.059 (0.109)	-0.033 (0.133)
Social * in-class	0.096 (0.187)	0.214 (0.204)	-0.173 (0.131)	-0.145 (0.107)
Social * private colleague	0.005 (0.195)	0.044 (0.219)	0.004 (0.125)	-0.052 (0.132)
Objectives Prime	-0.228 (0.139)	0.022 (0.157)	0.091* (0.053)	0.164* (0.095)
Social Prime	-0.230* (0.137)	-0.156 (0.154)	0.229*** (0.073)	0.189** (0.095)
In-class vignette	0.039 (0.150)	-0.178 (0.154)	0.178*** (0.068)	-0.028 (0.066)
Private colleague vignette	-0.000 (0.174)	-0.062 (0.183)	0.063 (0.063)	-0.000 (0.087)
Control rate in private student vignette	0.353	0.529	0.059	0.059
Observations	249	249	249	249

Notes: Private student conversation vignette is the base category vignette. All models use OLS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

⁶Due to reduced power, these effects are not significant at 0.05 level in only the private student vignette, but the size of the OLS coefficients are larger than those when we analyze responses to three vignettes together; see Table A9.

A.6.4 Covariate balance within each gender

Table A15: Balance of Covariates within Women CI teachers

	Control	Objectives	Social	P-value
Seniority in CI	0.412	0.453	0.383	0.758
Age	31.7	33.9	33.6	0.433
CCP member	0.354	0.348	0.500	0.202
Graduate degree	0.529	0.623	0.667	0.331
Years at CI	1.370	1.755	1.942	0.078
Teaching before CI (Y/N)	0.392	0.453	0.483	0.627
Hanban training over 1 month	0.353	0.346	0.492	0.202
Perceived friendliness of host-country media (on the scale of 0-10)	7.588	7.706	7.377	0.617
Number of respondents	51	53	61	–

Notes: P-values are from F tests of the Objectives Prime and Social Prime indicators.

Table A16: Balance of Covariates within Men CI teachers

	Control	Objectives	Social	P-value
Seniority in CI	0.512	0.279	0.323	0.065
Age	34.1	36.6	32.8	0.264
CCP member	0.719	0.514	0.600	0.225
Graduate degree	0.721	0.523	0.562	0.144
Years at CI	1.884	1.648	1.578	0.623
Teaching before CI (Y/N)	0.605	0.523	0.406	0.240
Hanban training over 1 month	0.419	0.591	0.375	0.125
Perceived friendliness of host-country media (on the scale of 0-10)	7.442	7.682	7.531	0.837
Number of respondents	43	44	32	–

Notes: P-values are from F tests of the Objectives Prime and Social Prime indicators.

A.6.5 Comparing men and women CI teachers on other covariates

Is the gendered heterogeneity we observed just a proxy for some more relevant covariates?

Table A17 shows that men and women CI teachers are balanced on most of pre-treatment

Table A17: Comparing Pre-treatment Covariates between Genders

	Men	Women	p-value
Seniority in CI	0.376	0.415	0.516
Age	34.7	33.1	0.207
CCP member	0.606	0.407	0.002
Graduate degree	0.605	0.610	0.936
Years at CI	1.714	1.706	0.959
Teaching before CI (Y/N)	0.521	0.445	0.209
Hanban training over 1 month	0.471	0.402	0.256
Perceived friendliness of host-country media (on the scale of 0-10)	7.555	7.546	0.969
Number of respondents	119	165	–

covariates measured in the survey. Also, when we regress gender on the covariates listed in Table A17, these covariates are jointly insignificant at predicting gender.

Table A17 shows that the only exception where men and women in our sample differ is that men CI teachers are more likely to be CCP members than women teachers. If the heterogeneous effects by gender we observed is due to gender imbalance on CCP membership, then we should see that the difference in effects by CCP vs. non-CCP is also statistically significant. However, that is not what we observed (see Table A18). In addition, the Objectives Prime decreases open discussion among men CI teachers and increases open discussion among women CI teachers. If gender is merely a proxy for CCP membership, then we should see that the Objectives Prime also has opposite effects by CCP membership. However, that is not what we see. The Objectives Prime decreases open discussion among both CCP and non-CCP members in our sample. These results suggest that the heterogeneous effects we observed by gender does not result from the imbalance between men and women on CCP membership.

A.6.6 Heterogeneity in effects by pre-registered covariates

In the pre-analysis plan, we registered 14 covariates for which we expected differences in the effects of the Objectives Prime and Social Prime between subgroups. The 14 covariates are: gender, age group, CCP membership, education level, seniority in CI, teaching experience before CI (yes/no), frequency of consuming PRC media, frequency of consuming host-country media, frequency of interacting with host-country teachers, agreeableness, whether perceive the host-country media is friendly to China, whether perceive the host-country community has antagonism on China, whether perceive CI teachers have mission to correct foreign political perceptions on China, and the US vs. other host countries.⁷ All these covariates are pre-treatment in that they appeared in the survey before the experiment section.

For each of the 14 registered covariates, we regress the dummy for “open discussion” on the treatment indicators, the covariate, and the interactions between treatments and the covariate.⁸ Then, we conduct significance test on the interaction terms. To address multiple comparisons, we adjusted the p-value using three methods: Benjamini-Hochberg correction (BH), Holm correction (Holm), and Bonferroni correction (BF). Benjamini-Hochberg controls the false discovery rate (FDR). Holm and Bonferroni corrections control the family-wise error rate (FWER).

Table A18 shows the difference in effects of the Objectives Prime, as well as adjusted significance level on the difference, by the 14 covariates we pre-registered. Results are based on logistic regression, but remain substantively unchanged if other parametric model is used. Estimate is the coefficient on the interaction between the Objectives Prime and the covariate, followed by the standard error (SE) and the unadjusted observed p-value on this interaction term. The last three columns report whether the difference in effects is significant at 0.05 level under each method of correction. The table shows that for the Objectives Prime, the size of difference in effects is biggest between the two genders and this difference is substantially higher than the difference by all other covariates we

⁷We partition continuous variables like “age” into multiple subgroups and test difference in effects between subgroups.

⁸We also control for other pre-treatment covariates that are not the covariate of interest in the regression.

pre-registered. It also shows that gender is the only covariate where difference between subgroups (women vs. men) withstands all three methods of correction.

Table A18: Difference in Effects of Objectives Prime

Subgroups in comparison	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted p-value	Adjusted significance at 0.05 level		
				BH	Holm	BF
Women vs. Men	0.410	0.139	0.003	TRUE	TRUE	TRUE
Age (>30 vs. ≤30)	0.058	0.112	0.604	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
CCP vs. Non-CCP	0.006	0.095	0.953	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Graduate vs. below Graduate	-0.019	0.094	0.838	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Work experience before CI (Yes vs. No)	0.057	0.113	0.614	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Freq PRC news consumer (Yes vs. No)	0.051	0.120	0.671	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Freq local news consumer (Yes vs. No)	0.084	0.127	0.512	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Seniority in CI (Senior vs. Junior)	-0.031	0.083	0.706	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Perceived host-country media friendly (Yes vs. No)	0.181	0.163	0.268	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Interact with host-country teacher everyday (Yes vs. No)	-0.089	0.064	0.162	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Perceived misunderstanding on China (high vs. low)	-0.043	0.078	0.580	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Self-reported agreeableness (Yes vs. No)	0.020	0.099	0.840	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Perceived political mission (Yes vs. No)	-0.016	0.081	0.848	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
US vs. Non-US	-0.097	0.068	0.151	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Notes: Outcome is an indicator variable for choosing to openly discuss Taiwan sovereignty. Estimates indicate difference in treatment effects on the probability of openly discussing Taiwan. All regressions use logit model. Frequent news consumer means reading relevant news several times a day.

Table A19 shows the difference in effects of the Social Prime, as well as adjusted significance level on the difference, by the 14 covariates we pre-registered. Results are based on logistic regression, but remain substantively unchanged when we use other parametric models. The table shows that difference in effects of the Social Prime is not significant by any covariate after addressing multiple comparisons. That said, the difference by gender has substantially larger magnitude than the difference by any other covariate we pre-registered. When unadjusted p-value is used, the difference in effects by gender is significant at 0.1 level, while the difference by any other covariate is insignificant. Given the limited power we have on this subject population, which we expect to happen in the pre-analysis plan, the substantial difference between genders suggests that there is interesting

gendered pattern of responses to the motive of avoiding social friction.

Table A19: Difference in Effects of Social Prime

Subgroups in comparison	Estimate	SE	Unadjusted p-value	Adjusted significance at 0.05 level		
				BH	Holm	BF
Women vs. Men	0.263	0.147	0.072	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Age (>30 vs. <=30)	0.008	0.094	0.935	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
CCP vs. Non-CCP	-0.013	0.086	0.880	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Graduate vs. below Graduate	-0.035	0.090	0.699	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Work experience before CI (No vs. Yes)	0.146	0.133	0.275	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Freq PRC news consumer (Yes vs. No)	-0.061	0.075	0.411	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Freq local news consumer (Yes vs. No)	-0.085	0.058	0.142	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Seniority in CI (Senior vs. Junior)	-0.091	0.056	0.104	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Perceived host-country media friendly (Yes vs. No)	-0.020	0.082	0.803	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Interact with host-country teacher everyday (Yes vs. No)	-0.054	0.073	0.462	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Perceived misunderstanding on China (high vs. low)	0.057	0.111	0.610	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Self-reported agreeableness (Yes vs. No)	-0.091	0.063	0.150	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
Perceived political mission (Yes vs. No)	0.094	0.118	0.422	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE
US vs. Non-US	-0.094	0.070	0.182	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Notes: Outcome is an indicator variable for choosing to openly discuss Taiwan sovereignty. Estimates indicate difference in treatment effects on the probability of openly discussing Taiwan. All regressions use logit model. Frequent news consumer means reading relevant news several times a day.

Overall, after addressing multiple comparisons, we find that the Objectives Prime has heterogeneous effects by gender on CI teachers' responses to the Taiwan issue. The two genders also exhibit larger difference in the effect of the Social Prime as compared to subgroups of other covariates.

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